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Time perception is fundamental and heavily researched, but the ﬁeld faces
a number of obstacles to theoretical progress. In this advanced review, we
focus on three pieces of ‘bad news’ for time perception research: temporal
perception is highly labile across changes in experimental context and task; there
are pronounced individual differences not just in overall performance but in the
use of different timing strategies and the effect of key variables; and laboratory
studies typically bear little relation to timing in the ‘real world’. We describe recent
examples of these issues and in each case offer some ‘good news’ by showing how
new research is addressing these challenges to provide rich insights into the neural
and information-processing bases of timing and time perception. © 2014 The Authors.
WIREs Cognitive Science published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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INTRODUCTION
The perception of time is fundamental to ourexperience and central to virtually all of our
activities. Correspondingly, time perception was one
of the earliest topics of experimental psychology and
has been extensively studied for well over a century.1,2
This research has brought many successes, such as the
finding that, to a first approximation, timing across
multiple species exhibits a scalar property such that
the variability of temporal representations increases
linearly with the timed duration for intervals ranging
from perhaps hundreds of milliseconds to tens of
minutes. In fact, timing by many species (including
humans) is approximately scale invariant, meaning
that the whole response distribution scales directly
with the length of the interval being timed.3,4
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However, it is also clear that, contrary to the
hopes (or implicit assumptions) of early psycho-
physicists,5,6 the brain is not like the measuring devices
of classical physics: there is no immutable map-
ping between external magnitudes and internal sen-
sations that can be captured by simple mathematical
functions.7 Indeed, time perception poses a number of
unique challenges. For one thing, there is no time-sense
organ or single pathway carrying temporal informa-
tion from the periphery to the brain.8,9 Rather, all
sensory channels support time perception, and it is
unclear how far these representations are mediated
by common structures and mechanisms . Moreover,
timing occurs over massively varying scales, from
microseconds to years,10 and at intermediate dura-
tions multiple mechanisms likely operate in parallel,
complicating the search for simple information pro-
cessing models and neural substrates.
Partly for these reasons, many ‘big questions’
about time perception remain incompletely answered.
For example, researchers continue to debate the rela-
tionship between physical time and the growth of
subjective duration, with some arguing for a lin-
ear relationship11 and others positing a non-linear
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mapping such as logarithmic compression.12 Similarly,
there is disagreement about whether timing is based
on local or centralized processes.13 Regarding the for-
mer, temporal representations may be abstracted from
time-dependent changes in local cortical networks that
are activated by specific stimuli.14 That is, in the same
way that one can infer how long ago a rock was
thrown into a pond by the pattern of ripples on the
surface, so the brain may extract temporal informa-
tion from the pattern of neural activity triggered by
the presentation of a stimulus.15 Other accounts posit
a dedicated ‘internal clock’, a centralized system for
measuring time across stimuli and tasks.16 The rep-
resentation of time by this clock might involve the
accumulation of pulses emitted by a pacemaker, or
the detection of coincident activity among a set of
oscillators with different periods.17 Finally, the basis
and generality of the scalar property of timing remain
the subject of considerable debate, with scale invari-
ance variously attributed to the pulse-rate of a dedi-
cated pacemaker,12 the transfer of temporal represen-
tations into memory,18 or the emergent properties of
low-level interactions between neurons.19,20 Indeed,
although the scalar property is widely observed, stud-
ies of human duration discrimination suggest that the
Weber fraction is not constant over the range of about
0.5–2 seconds, violating scalar timing and providing a
further theoretical challenge.21,22
Rather than focusing on these specific theoret-
ical issues, the current review discusses three gen-
eral challenges in the study of interval timing: (1) the
sensitivity of time perception to the specific circum-
stances in which the time interval is experienced; (2)
the differences between individuals in both the mech-
anisms and substrates of interval timing; and (3) the
fact that the ‘real world’ is much more complex and
dynamic than the stimuli and tasks used in most inter-
val timing experiments. In each case, we first outline
the ‘bad news’ by describing examples from recent
studies which illustrate how these issues complicate
and potentially hinder progress in time perception
research. We then offer an alternative assessment—the
‘good news’—by showing how new findings and the-
orizing are helping to meet these challenges, providing
deeper insights into the representation and judgment
of time.
We focus primarily on durations of a few hun-
dred to a few thousand milliseconds, as this range of
intervals is the most intensely studied in human partic-
ipants; it also has the advantages of being long enough
to engage ‘cognitive’ processes23 but short enough to
permit repeated measurements from each participant.
Toward the end of the paper, we consider whether
results with these kinds of moderate durations gener-
alize to the longer intervals judged in ‘real life’.
SENSITIVITY OF TIME PERCEPTION
TO THE METHOD OF MEASUREMENT
The Bad News: Research Increasingly
Demonstrates the Lability of
Temporal Judgments
The quest for basic principles of time perception is
blighted by the remarkable sensitivity of temporal
judgment to ‘extraneous’ contextual factors. First, it
is increasingly clear that the judgment of a given
duration depends on both the non-temporal properties
of the stimuli that define the interval and the task
used to elicit a duration judgment. Second, even when
these factors are held constant, the judgment of a given
interval is influenced by both the overall ensemble of
stimuli during the session (the ‘global’ context) and the
most recently presented stimulus (the ‘local’ context).
Finally, even when stimuli, task, and context are
controlled, judgments change as a result of experience
and practice, with recent work showing just how
plastic temporal representations can be. Some of these
effects have been long-documented; we focus on recent
research that is revealing the wide- and far-ranging
context-sensitivity of temporal judgments.
Stimulus and Task Sensitivity
One basic finding is that the same duration will be
perceived differently depending on how it is deli-
mited, giving rise to what have been called ‘tempo-
ral illusions’.24 The ever-expanding range of non-
temporal factors which influence the perception of a
given interval is truly impressive. Some of these fac-
tors, such as sensory modality,25,26 intensity,27 size,28
complexity,29 familiarity,30 and whether an interval
is ‘filled’ or ‘empty’,31 have been recognized for some
time; others, such as the biasing effects of symbolic
magnitude,28 difference-from-background,27 emo-
tionality,32 pitch,33 speed,34 and changes in speed35
have been identified in recent years, and are the focus
of increasing attention. This plethora of effects poses
a serious challenge for researchers who seek unifying
principles of interval timing.16
In addition to these stimulus-based effects, it is
increasingly clear that the results of timing experi-
ments often depend upon the method used to measure
the percept (see Grondin36,37for reviews of time per-
ception methodology). For example, estimation tasks
(e.g., ‘how long was that square visible?’) and produc-
tion tasks (e.g., ‘press this button when the square has
been on the screen for X seconds’) have traditionally
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been assumed to have a reciprocal relation—stimuli
which ‘seem longer’ will elicit larger estimates but
shorter productions38 (because, for example, the time
needed to reach a given number of pacemaker pulses
will be reduced). However, the two methodologies can
produce divergent results. For example, one recent
study found that novel images were judged to last
longer than repeated ones (implying a faster inter-
nal clock, leading to longer subjective duration),
but that they were also left on-screen for longer
in a production task39 (implying a slower internal
clock, leading to a shorter subjective duration); still
greater methodological dependence has been reported
in recent investigations of the effects of emotional
arousal on subjective time, with angry faces judged
longer than neutral ones in verbal estimation and tem-
poral production tasks but not in temporal general-
ization or reproduction tasks.40 Many timing studies
use a single judgment task, which may explain why
researchers investigating ostensibly similar perceptual
effects sometimes produce conflicting results. That is,
apparent inconsistencies in the effects of a particu-
lar manipulation or factor may actually be due to
overlooked differences in methodology. For example,
Witherspoon and Allan found that familiar stimuli
were judged longer than unstudied items30 whereas
Ono and Kawahara found the reverse effects38; the
former study used a category judgment task whereas
the latter used temporal production, which might
explain the contradictory results.
‘Global’ and ‘Local’ Context
Even when non-temporal properties and task require-
ments are held constant, time perception is sensi-
tive to the set of durations used in the study—the
‘global’ context. For example, in temporal bisection
tasks the participant classifies a set of intermediate
durations according to whether they are closest to a
‘short’ or ‘long’ anchor duration. For rats and pigeons,
the bisection point (the duration where ‘short’ and
‘long’ responses are equally likely) is typically near
the geometric mean (GM) of the two standards,3 but
in humans it has been shown to depend on the dis-
tribution of intermediate durations, being closer to
the GM when their spacing is logarithmic, but closer
to the arithmetic mean (AM) when it is linear.3,41,42
Likewise, temporal generalization gradients (which
indicate the probability that a given duration will
be judged equal to a particular standard) become
steeper when the comparison intervals are clustered
more closely around the standard,43 leading to devi-
ations from scalar timing if task difficulty is not care-
fully controlled across different standards.3 This sen-
sitivity to global context extends to the effects of
non-temporal factors; for example, the effects on time
judgments of changes in tone pitch and visual marker
size depend on the other pitches/markers presented
during the experiment33,44; correspondingly, identical
manipulations can produce different results depend-
ing on whether they are effected within or between
subjects.45
Temporal judgments also depend on the ‘local’
context—that is, on the microstructure of the exper-
imental session (the stimulus presented on the previ-
ous trial, the choice of inter-stimulus interval, and so
forth). As one example, researchers routinely seek to
measure the precision of temporal representation by
employing two-alternative forced-choice (2AFC) tasks
(where a fixed standard S and a variable comparison
C are presented one after the other and participants
indicate which of the two was longer). It has been
known since Fechner that the order of presentation
affects the point of subjective equality (PSE, the com-
parison duration judged equal to the standard), with
the second interval of a pair often being overestimated
relative to the first—although the size and direction of
this time order error is variable.46 Recent work has
focussed on the finding that discrimination thresholds
also depend on stimulus order, being lower when the
standard precedes the comparison than when the com-
parison comes first. This ‘Type B’ effect47 challenges
the long-standing and intuitive conception of discrim-
ination as the computation of a difference between the
two stimuli48; such a calculation clearly makes sense
when the two intervals are regarded as discrete phys-
ical quantities, but it cannot accommodate the effect
of stimulus order on discrimination accuracy, because
subtraction is commutative.
Learning and Plasticity
Finally, even when non-temporal properties, task,
judgment set, and microstructure are held constant,
researchers are confronted with the plasticity of the
observer. Researchers make repeated observations to
reduce the noise in their data, but in the case of
human perception this simply creates a moving tar-
get because neural plasticity and learning can produce
dramatic changes in performance over relatively short
periods of time. Such plasticity has recently been inves-
tigated in time perception research.49 In one study, the
threshold for discriminating a 100-ms interval from
longer intervals approximately halved over 10 days of
training.50 Recent work by Matthews and Grondin51
found smaller but still pronounced reductions in the
Weber Fraction for intervals ranging from 100 to
1500 ms; moreover, there was no indication that per-
formance had plateaued even after 20 sessions (two
per day) training on each interval. Such learning gen-
eralizes across non-temporal features of the interval
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FIGURE 1 | The effects of extended practice on the precision of temporal discrimination. Participants classiﬁed intervals as ‘short’ or ‘long’
according to whether the interval was shorter/longer than a given base duration. The top left panel shows data from one participant, Alfred
Kristofferson, after extensive self-experimentation; it plots the variability in temporal representation (q, calculated according to a rather speciﬁc set of
assumptions) as a function of base duration.55 The dashed line summarizes performance early in training; after prolonged practice, the data points
‘unfold’ from this line to give a staircase structure where both the height of the steps and the width of the treads double in magnitude with each
successive step. Kristofferson interpreted this as evidence for a ‘time quantum’. The top right and bottom panels show similar data from two other
participants (WM and FMS51). The eye of faith might discern some indication of a step pattern for these participants, but it is nowhere near as
pronounced as for Kristofferson and the ﬁt of Kristofferson’s theoretically motivated step function is poor. (This function posits that the ‘treads’ of the
staircase have the same near-horizontal slope but both their width and the step between them periodically doubles, corresponding to systematic
doubling in the base of a triangular noise distribution; see Figure 4 of the paper by Matthews and Grondin51). Rather, for WM the variability in
temporal representation is a quadratic function of base duration and for FMS the relation is linear. (Reprinted with permission from Ref 51)
markers such as tone frequency,50,52 but training at
one standard duration has little effect on discrimina-
tion at other durations.50–52 Similarly, tactile temporal
discrimination learning generalizes across skin loca-
tions but not durations,53 and visual temporal dis-
crimination learning generalizes across hemispheres,
implying that the plasticity is not at an early stage in
processing.54
This lability is not simply a question of improve-
ment over time: key patterns in the data can com-
pletely shift with repeated exposure. One example
comes from a Herculean bout of self-experimentation
by Alfred Kristofferson, who extensively practiced
temporal discrimination using standards ranging from
100–1480 ms.55 Early in training the variability of
temporal representations was linearly related to the
base duration; after extensive practice, however, a
striking ‘staircase’ pattern emerged, with regions of
constant variability punctuated by approximate ‘dou-
bling’ at intervals which themselves double as base
duration increases (Figure 1). Such plasticity makes
it impossible to treat the brain like a physical mea-
surement device, but very few researchers routinely
test whether practice effects might be modulating the
manipulations they wish to study.
The foregoing issues are not unique to time per-
ception research, but they nonetheless pose enormous
challenges for researchers who seek to use simple
experimental and analytic tools to establish funda-
mental principles of timing and time perception.
The Good News: Recent Models Explain
These Effects within Unifying Frameworks
Faced with this potentially overwhelming complexity,
the good news is that systematic investigation of
the effects of task, context, and microstructure can
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provide important insights into the representation and
judgment of temporal information. We discuss just
two recent examples.
Contextual Sensitivity Links Time Perception
to General Principles of Cognition
The fact that the perception and judgment of a
given item depends on the other items presented dur-
ing the session is, of course, not unique to time
perception.56,57 Correspondingly, careful investigation
of these contextual dependencies can establish regular-
ities that cut across multiple domains.
One example is provided by the application
of range-frequency theory (RFT58) to temporal judg-
ment. RFT posits that the judged value of a given stim-
ulus is a compromise between (a) its position in the
range defined by the smallest and largest items in the
judgment set—the range principle—and (b) its relative
rank position (i.e., the proportion of items in the set
which are of lower magnitude)—the frequency princi-
ple. RFT emerged in the 1960s as a competitor to the
idea that items are judged with respect to the mean of
the stimulus set, and has been found to offer a superior
account of context effects across multiple domains.59
Brown and colleagues41 have recently applied
these ideas to time perception. They employed a tem-
poral bisection task in which they varied the distri-
bution of durations between the ‘short’ and ‘long’
anchor durations to be highly or moderately posi-
tively skewed (i.e., with lots of short durations and
few long ones), arithmetically spaced, or moderately
negatively skewed. The bisection points shifted pro-
gressively rightwards as the skew became more neg-
ative, and this effect was more pronounced when the
ratio of long:short anchors was larger. The data were
well-described by a temporal range-frequency theory
(TFRT) account in which the subjective magnitude of
each duration is given by its range-frequency value and
the choice rule is based on the psychological distance
between this magnitude and the subjective magnitude
of the two standards (Figure 2). Moreover, the authors
showed how this range-frequency model can account
for the puzzling shifts in the bisection point noted in
the literature,3 and for the effects of stimulus spacing
on participants’ ability to classify durations in an abso-
lute identification task.41,60 More recently, this tempo-
ral range-frequency theory has been used to model the
finding that spacing effects on duration judgments are
larger for auditory stimuli than visual stimuli.61
An alternative line of research has adopted a
Bayesian framework to explain context effects within
a wide-ranging and potentially unifying approach to
perception and cognition.62 Jazayeri and Shadlen63
found that reproduced intervals gravitate toward the
average of the set of durations in the experimental
session. This effect was more pronounced for longer
duration sets, where scalar variability implies greater
uncertainty about the true time. Such central tendency
of judgment is well-known and widespread,56 but
Jazayeri and Shadlen offered a novel perspective by
showing that the effect can be described by a Bayesian
observer model in which a noisy measurement of the
stimulus is combined with prior information about the
distribution of stimuli to obtain a posterior proba-
bility distribution for the stimulus magnitude. Under
this account, the central tendency of judgment is not
simply a ‘nuisance’ bias; it reflects an optimizing strat-
egy in which observers have implicit knowledge of
the variability of their time representations and corre-
spondingly adjust their use of prior probability infor-
mation. More recent work has shown that, with some
refinements to the prior distribution, this framework
can be extended to explain the effects of modality and
expertise.64 Specifically, the central tendency effect
was seen for visual but not auditory stimuli; the rep-
resentations of visually defined durations are typically
less precise than auditory ones which, in the Bayesian
framework, leads to greater reliance on the prior in
the visual case. Moreover, highly trained drummers
showed veridical reproductions in both modalities;
their superior timing precision means they make little
use of the prior even when the durations are defined
by visual stimuli. The same Bayesian approach has
also been used to model on- and off-medication timing
performance by patients with Parkinson’s disease, and
other distortions in temporal memory tasks where the
goal is to optimize timing performance under condi-
tions of uncertainty.62
In short, the context effects that bedevil time-
perception researchers actually link the field to a large
body of empirical and theoretical work from other
domains, offering the possibility of unified models
of cognition and providing insights into both the
functional basis for these effects and the otherwise
puzzling instability of some empirical findings.
Context Effects Illuminate the Representation
of Temporal Information
In addition to the descriptive accounts of the pre-
vious section, the context-sensitivity of time percep-
tion can also help clarify the ways in which temporal
information is represented, combined, and evaluated.
One recent example comes from the dynamic inter-
nal reference model (IRM48), developed to account
for the finding that discrimination accuracy depends
on the order of the standard and comparison stim-
uli (described above). Under this account, partic-
ipants compare the second stimulus in each pair
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FIGURE 2 | The effects of stimulus spacing on temporal bisection by humans. The top panels show the proportion of ‘long’ responses for super
logarithmic (high positive skew), logarithmic (moderate positive skew), arithmetic (no skew), and antilogarithmic (moderate negative skew) spacing
of the comparison durations when the two standard intervals are widely separated (left panel) or differ by only a small ratio (right panel). As the skew
becomes more negative, the bisection point shifts to the right. The bottom panels show that these context effects are well-described by temporal
range-frequency theory. (Reprinted with permission from Ref 41)
with an internal reference comprising a weighted
combination of the first stimulus and the internal
reference level from the previous trial. [Formally,
In = gIn–1 + (1 – g)X1,n , where In is the reference level
on the nth trial, X1,n is the internal representation of
the first duration on the nth trial, and g is the weight-
ing parameter.] If the difference between the second
stimulus and this internal reference is positive, the sec-
ond stimulus is judged to be longer than the first; if the
difference is negative, the first stimulus is judged to be
the longer.
The IRM predicts an effect of order on discrim-
ination accuracy because the difference between the
second stimulus and the internal reference is more
variable when the first stimulus is the variable com-
parison duration (i.e., stimulus order <cs>) than when
it is the fixed standard duration (order <sc>). Monte
Carlo simulations show that the model predicts a sim-
ilar effect irrespective of whether the stimulus orders
are blocked or randomly intermixed, which matches
the empirical pattern.48 Moreover, the model predicts
sequential effects when stimulus order is fixed within
blocks of trials: for order <cs>, a long comparison on
the previous trial increases the internal reference level,
making it less likely that the current standard stimulus
will be judged the longer of the pair (and vice-versa
when the previous comparison duration was short).
By contrast, no sequential effects are predicted for
the order <sc>, because the same standard duration
is incorporated into the internal reference on every
trial (in the model, only the first member of each
pair contributes to the reference level). Again, these
predictions nicely match the data.48
More recent work has shown that the effect of
stimulus order is under attentional control. Inform-
ing participants which of the two intervals contains
the variable comparison interval reduces the effect
of stimulus order on the fidelity of discrimination,
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a modulation which can be modeled by reducing
the weight given to previous trials. The IRM has
also been used to account for order effects in equal-
ity judgments (‘are these two intervals the same or
different?’65) and to the Vierordt effect in temporal
productions.66
The IRM therefore builds on descriptive ac-
counts of order effects on discrimination46 by pro-
viding an explicit mechanism for the formation of
subjective standards which captures a wide range of
findings. Similar progress has been made in develop-
ing quantitative, process models of both global con-
text effects (i.e., the effects of stimulus range and the
distribution of items within the set) and local con-
text effects (i.e., the pattern of assimilation to the
immediately preceding stimulus and contrast to stim-
uli earlier in the sequence) that arise when partici-
pants have to identify each of a set of durations (or
other stimuli) with a unique label.41,57,60,67 Moreover,
for relatively short durations (e.g., less than 1 sec-
ond), researchers have modeled the effects of distrac-
tor signals and changes in inter-stimulus interval with
state-dependent networks in which the time between
two sensory events is represented by the changing
state of local networks that respond to the marker
signals.14,15
In short, the ‘instability’ of time perception can
clarify the representation, combination, and evalua-
tion of temporal information, allowing us to predict
the microstructure of performance across an experi-
mental session.
INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES
The Bad News: Recent Work Has Revealed
Marked Individual Differences,
Even for ‘Classic’ Effects
Although individual differences in perception and cog-
nition have long been recognized as potentially impor-
tant, most work in timing and time perception has
ignored them and has focussed instead on establish-
ing robust effects that emerge when data are averaged
across participants. However, recent work is increas-
ingly identifying cases where distinct sub-groups of
participants, ostensibly from the same population,
nonetheless show considerable heterogeneity—even
for well-established effects. Such inter-participant dif-
ferences are likely to be of considerable theoretical and
practical importance.
One example comes from the widely reported
finding that novel stimuli (‘oddballs’) have longer
subjective duration than repeated items. This finding
has been found in numerous experiments using diverse
techniques,68 and is robust enough to be regarded as
a standard ‘temporal illusion’.24 Data from one study
of this effect (Experiment 2 of a study by Matthews39)
are plotted in Figure 3. On each trial participants
saw two photographs and judged whether the second
(comparison) stimulus was presented for more or less
time than the first (standard) stimulus (whose duration
was always 506 ms). The second picture was either
a repeat of the first or was novel. The top left panel
shows the proportion of ‘longer’ responses, averaged
across participants; the psychometric functions rise
smoothly, and that for the ‘novel’ items is clearly
shifted leftward, implying longer perceived duration
for these items. A paired t-test conducted on the PSEs
estimated from individual participant’s data for each
condition confirmed this as the overall pattern.
However, there is marked variation among
observers. The top right panel, for example, shows
a participant with particularly good temporal dis-
crimination who does not show the repetition effect;
the bottom left shows a participant with reasonable
discrimination who is nonetheless highly influenced
by stimulus repetition; and the bottom right shows
a participant whose temporal discrimination is poor,
and who is effectively basing their judgments entirely
on the novelty of the image. Thus, the overall size
of the effect masks potentially important variation.
A key point is that there may be systematic covaria-
tion between different aspects of performance and the
effects of experimental manipulations such as the pro-
vision of feedback.69 In this study, for example, there
was a substantial negative correlation between the
size of the repetition effect and discrimination perfor-
mance; people with poorer temporal discrimination
were more affected by repetition.
This kind of heterogeneity arises in many
studies of time perception, but is usually ignored
or only briefly commented on. As another recent
example, Figure 1 plots two additional participants
who repeated the marathon discrimination training
undertaken by Kristofferson55 (see above). Neither
participant replicated Kristofferson’s ‘step’ pattern;
one shows a linear relation between variability and
base duration while the other shows a quadratic
pattern.51 Such large individual differences obviously
make it harder to replicate a given effect, and ignor-
ing them risks overlooking theoretically important
relations between variables. Likewise, recent work
by Hasuo and colleagues70 has shown pronounced
individual differences in the ‘filled duration illusion’.
This is the finding that a given interval seems longer
when filled with continuous stimulation (e.g., a steady
tone) than when it is ‘empty’ (e.g., a silent interval
delimited by two brief clicks). This widely reported
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FIGURE 3 | Individual differences in the effect of stimulus repetition on duration discrimination. Participants saw two images and indicated
whether the second was longer or shorter than the ﬁrst. The graphs show the probability of a ‘longer’ response as a function of the duration of the
second (comparison) stimulus when the comparison image is a repeat of the standard image (Rep) and when it is different (Novel). The top left panel
shows data averaged across participants; the top right shows a participant with good discrimination who was little affected by repetition; the bottom
left shows a participant with reasonable overall discrimination but who judged novel images to be much longer than repeats of the same duration;
the bottom right shows a participant with the same tendency but whose discrimination was very poor. Data are from a study reported by Matthews.39
effect has informed both pacemaker-accumulator
and alternative models of timing31,33,71; however,
although the filled-duration illusion is robust in
participant-averaged data, cluster analysis shows
distinct sub-populations for whom the effect does and
does not arise; indeed, at short durations a sub-group
of people show the reverse of the usual effect.72
The Good News: Neuroimaging,
Pharmacology, and Genetics Are Providing
New Insights into Inter-Individual Variation
The good news is that emerging statistical tech-
niques, including multilevel analysis73 and hierar-
chical Bayesian modeling,74 provide new ways to
deconstruct performance in terms of underlying vari-
ables, and that neuroscience is increasingly providing
insights into the origins of individual differences in
timing performance. We focus here on three examples
of the latter.
Individual Differences in Timing Strategy
One basic question concerns whether time percep-
tion is interval (duration) based or beat (rhythm)
based.75 That is, how far does interval timing
involve a stopwatch-like mechanism (e.g., the
pacemaker-accumulator system of scalar timing
theory16) and how far is it based on the synchro-
nization of internal oscillatory activity with external
stimulation (e.g., the entrainment model of Large
and Jones76)? Behavioral and neural evidence sug-
gests that both mechanisms are important and
rest upon distinct (but perhaps connected) neural
substrates.77
The issue is complicated by the fact that, as well
as the ability of individual participants to employ both
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FIGURE 4 | Individual differences in beat perception. The top panel shows the stimulus sequences for the Control and Test trials, and the pattern
of responses for weak and strong beat perceivers. In the control condition, listeners hear a pair of tones separated by 600 ms followed by another
pair with a separation of 600 ms ±ΔT. Both strong and weak beat perceivers judge the sequence as ‘speeding up’ when the ﬁnal separation is less
than 600 ms and as ‘slowing down’ when it is more than 600 ms. On test trials, the ﬁrst part of the sequence comprises a run of 3 tones separated by
300 ms so that the 600-ms periodicity is implicit. Strong beat-perceivers respond as for the control trials; weak beat-perceivers are insensitive to the
600-ms periodicity and judge all sequences as ‘slowing down’ because even the shortest ﬁnal interval is longer than the 300 ms that separates the
ﬁrst 3 tones. The bottom panel shows the brain regions showing differential activity for the two groups of participants. Note that these neural
differences arise even for the control sequences, where behavioral responses are identical. (Reprinted with permission from Ref 78)
strategies, people differ in their ‘natural’ tendency
to employ beat-based versus interval-based timing.
Recent work has brought new clarity by establishing
the neural correlates of individual differences in tim-
ing strategy. Grahn and McAuley78 had participants
judge whether tone sequences were ‘speeding up’ or
‘slowing down’ (Figure 4). In the control condition
the sequences comprised two pairs of tones, the first
with an inter-tone interval (ITI) of 600 ms and the sec-
ond with an ITI that varied around 600 ms. When the
second interval was shorter than 600 ms, participants
uniformly perceived the sequence as ‘speeding up’;
when it was more than 600 ms, the sequence was per-
ceived as ‘slowing down’. In the test condition, the first
2 tones were replaced by a sequence of 3 tones with an
ITI of 300 ms, giving an implied periodic beat of 600
ms which was not explicitly emphasized. When judg-
ing these sequences, participants fell into two distinct
groups: ‘strong’ beat perceivers, for whom final inter-
vals less than 600 ms were systematically perceived
as speeding up, and ‘weak’ beat perceivers, for whom
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final intervals less than 600ms were perceived as slow-
ing down. That is, ‘weak’ beat perceivers responded on
the basis of the 300-ms separation between the first 3
tones, whereas ‘strong’ beat perceivers extracted the
implied 600-ms interval. Importantly, the two groups
did not differ in overall temporal sensitivity.
Functional magnetic resonance imaging revealed
that ‘strong’ beat perceivers showed greater activ-
ity than ‘weak’ beat perceivers in the supplementary
motor area (SMA), left premotor cortex, and left
insula; ‘weak’ beat perceivers showed greater activa-
tion in the right premotor cortex, the left posterior
superior and left middle temporal gyri. Importantly,
these differences arose even for the control sequences,
where behavioral responding was the same for the
two groups (Figure 4). Grahn and McAuley linked
their data to the striatal beat-frequency model of inter-
val timing,17,79 wherein neurons in the basal ganglia
detect the coincident activity of oscillatory activity
among cortical neurons, with particular patterns of
coincidence representing particular durations. In this
framework, ‘strong’ beat perceivers may more read-
ily ‘tune in’ to the implied beat by entraining specific
cortical oscillators. More recent work using electroen-
cephalography suggests that differences in beat per-
ception correspond to differential processing of the
final tone in the sequence (with strong beat-perceivers
showing greater build-up of contingent negative vari-
ation prior to the final tone and a larger parietal pos-
itivity after it) rather than differences in the sensory
encoding of the initial sequence.80
These neuroimaging studies are complemented
by the development of behavioral test batteries which
can be used to identify both the precise nature
of individual and group differences in timing and
time perception and the inter-relations among differ-
ent aspects of timing performance. The Battery for
the Assessment of Auditory and Sensorimotor Tim-
ing Abilities (BAASTA) is one such tool; it includes
duration discrimination, anisochrony detection, beat
alignment, synchronization-continuation and tapping
tasks, and has been used to compare musicians and
non-musicians and to identify the specific timing
impairments of patients with Parkinson’s disease.81
Individual Differences in Response
to Pharmacological Treatment
Lake andMeck82 had healthy young adults complete a
peak-interval timing task (where the goal is to concen-
trate a sequence of spacebar presses around a trained
duration) under the influence of d-amphetamine [an
indirect dopamine (DA) receptor agonist], haloperidol
(a direct DA receptor antagonist), and a placebo. Cru-
cially, self-reported liking for the drug treatment mod-
erated the effects of d-amphetamine on timing, with a
positive correlation between liking and the shift in the
timing of peak responding. Self-reported drug-liking
also negatively correlated with a pre-measure of sim-
ple reaction time (SRT), an index of baseline attention
which may reflect baseline DA levels. When the par-
ticipants were divided according to this pre-measure,
those high in attentional lapses (i.e., those with low
drug liking) showed a leftward shift in the response
curve when given d-amphetamine (relative to placebo)
but a rightward shift following haloperidol. That is,
for this group, increasing or decreasing DA activity
produced the classic increase/decrease in ‘clock speed’
found in previous research.83 However, for partici-
pants low in baseline-lapses (i.e., high in drug lik-
ing), the response function following d-amphetamine
was shifted to the right of the placebo, with haloperi-
dol having little or no effect at the dose studied.
The authors interpret this rightward shift as reflect-
ing reduced attention to time among those people who
particularly enjoyed the effects of d-amphetamine.
That is, because reduced attention to ‘time in pass-
ing’ reduces perceived duration,84 so participants
who experienced drug-induced euphoria following
d-amphetamine administration focussed their atten-
tion on the hedonic effects of the drug rather than
on their perception of time, and delayed their peak
responding as a consequence.
The key point here is that the psychological
effects of pharmacological challenge are modulated by
individual differences in subjective experience, which
in turn map on to measurable differences in pre-test
performance and, perhaps, to underlying differences
in neurotransmitter levels.85
Individual Differences in Genotype
Perhaps the most fundamental way to link individual
differences in timing and time perception to neuro-
chemistry is by studying genetic variation. A compre-
hensive example was recently provided by Sysoeva and
colleagues.86 These authors recruited right-handed
Russian male participants for whom DNA samples
had previously been taken, and selected a sample com-
prising a mix of rare and common genotypes of genes
involved in regulating dopaminergic and serotoner-
gic activity. The participants completed a duration
discrimination task in which they judged whether the
first or second of two visual stimuli was shown for the
shorter time.
As in many other studies employing this kind
of 2AFC task, most participants showed a negative
time order error, such that the second interval was
over-estimated relative to the first (the two intervals
were equally likely to be judged ‘shorter’ when the
first was in fact longer than the second), which the
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authors interpreted in terms of leakage from a neu-
ral accumulator representing the first interval. The key
finding was that the magnitude of this effect (indexed
by both the PSE and by formal estimation of the leak-
age parameter) was related to differences in genotypes.
The PSE was more negative (overestimation of the
second interval was greater, implying greater leakage
from the accumulator) for carriers of genotypes asso-
ciated with greater serotonin (5-HT) transmission.
Specifically, the PSE was more negative for (1) carri-
ers of the SS genotype of the 5-HTT gene (associated
with lower 5-HT reuptake) than for carriers of the
SL and LL variants, (2) carriers of the low-expression
variant of monoamine oxidase A (MAOA, associated
with lower 5-HT breakdown) than for carriers of
the high-expression variant, and (3) carriers of the
TT genotype of the 5-HT2a receptor (associated with
higher receptor density) than for CC-carriers. In con-
trast, differences in time perception were not related
to differences in the genes encoding components of the
DA system, although more recent genetic studies have
shown DA receptors, transporter, and enzyme systems
to be important for interval timing.87–89
In summary, new examinations of the specific
neural, pharmacological, and genetic bases for indi-
vidual differences in time perception are helping to
account for heterogeneous performance and shed light
on long-standing theoretical questions such as the rel-
ative importance of beat-based versus interval-based
timing, the role of attention in time perception, and the
basis for the time-order error. Moreover, these insights
are supplemented by recent work linking differences in
timing variability to cortical anatomy.90
TIME PERCEPTION IN THE
‘REAL WORLD’
The Bad News: Most Time Perception
Research Uses Simple Stimuli and
Artificial Tasks
In most studies of temporal judgment, researchers
present a limited set of items many times, eliciting
repeated judgments of the same stimulus and with
the participant fully aware that a time judgment
will be required for each item (i.e., their judgments
are ‘prospective’). These tasks bear little relation
to ‘normal life’, where time estimates are usually
one-off judgments of single (often complex, dynamic,
temporally structured) events. There have, of course,
been studies of ‘retrospective’ time judgments (where
the participant only learns that a time judgment is
required after the event), and comparisons of these
with ‘prospective’ judgments.91 However, the one-off
nature of most retrospective judgments presents a
practical barrier to large-scale data collection, and
the number of studies comparing prospective and
retrospective paradigms with other task dimensions
held constant is small,92 with only a handful that have
used intervals longer than a few minutes.93 There is a
similar paucity of studies exploring whether principles
established for brief stimuli presented multiple times
(e.g. modality differences, intensity effects) also apply
to naturalistic one-off judgments of longer intervals
defined by complex event sequences.
A related issue concerns the kinds of stimuli used
in most previous research. Studies of time percep-
tion typically use homogenous stimuli such as pure
tones, steady lights, or static images, and although
there is a large literature on rhythm perception, the
effect of temporal structure on the perceived dura-
tion of the overall sequence has received relatively lit-
tle attention (with some exceptions94). However, most
naturally occurring stimuli are dynamic and tempo-
rally structured; there is increasing appreciation of
the importance of temporal information to such ‘real
world’ tasks as face processing,95 scene memory,96–98
and emotion recognition,99 which renders pressing
the need for models of timing that can accommodate
dynamic event sequences.
The bad news, then, is that most of our research
has traditionally concerned stimuli and tasks which
bear little relation to ‘real life’, making it hard to know
whether we are missing theoretically important effects
and interactions (by focusing on rather simplistic
stimuli) and whether the principles in the laboratory
will generalize to real-life situations.
The Good News: Recent Data Show that
Lab Results Generalize and Comprehensive
Models Are within Reach
On a positive note, researchers are increasingly sup-
plementing the traditional approaches outlined above
with (1) more naturalistic judgment tasks and (2) tem-
porally structured, dynamic stimuli; this work gives
reason for optimism about the generality of effects pre-
viously studied in the laboratory, and about the poten-
tial for formal models of timing that can accommodate
the judgment of complex stimuli.
Naturalistic Tasks
One example of this kind of ecologically valid study
was recently provided by Grondin and colleagues.93
These authors recruited 116 video Gamers at gaming
centers in Quebec—players who had arrived at the
centers to play a game of their choice as a normal
leisure activity, rather than being explicitly recruited
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FIGURE 5 | The effects of sequence structure on the judged duration of tone sequences. The left panel shows judgments of decelerating (Dec),
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details). (Reprinted with permission from Ref 33)
for an experiment. After 12, 35, or 58 min of their
chosen game the players were asked to estimate how
long they had been playing. Each player estimated a
single duration; players in the prospective condition
had been notified in advance that a time judgment
would be requested whereas those in the retrospec-
tive condition had not. The ratio of judged-to-actual
duration was greater than 1.0 in all conditions (that
is, players overestimated their game time), and this
tendency was significantly more pronounced in the
12-min duration than the 35- and 59-min conditions
(which did not differ). Moreover, judged durations
were longer in the prospective condition than in the
retrospective condition (irrespective of physical dura-
tion). In other words, this very naturalistic study pro-
duced data that show several features found in more
traditional research (namely, a general overestimation
of time that relatively ‘flattens off’ at longer durations
and that is more pronounced when the time estimate is
anticipated; there was also some indication of greater
absolute variability in prospective than retrospective
judgments, but this effect missed significance).
It is reassuring that traditional experimental
effects extend to the ‘real world’, but we must sound
two notes of caution. First, not all naturalistic stud-
ies produce such replications. Boltz,100 for example,
reported no difference between prospective and retro-
spective judgments of naturalistic events (video clips
of people eating, playing basketball, etc.), and Darlow
and colleagues101 recently found no effect of changes
in tempo on one-off judgments of music, reading, or
perceptuo-motor tasks, despite such tempo-changes
having very pronounced effects in psychophysical
studies.33 Second, when effects do generalize, this can
prompt questions about the traditional explanations
of these effects. For example, prospective judgments
are usually argued to be longer because participants
are paying ‘greater attention to time’ (such that, for
example, a larger number of pacemaker pulses accu-
mulates during a given interval than when process-
ing is directed to non-temporal information). Does
this idea hold water when, in the aforementioned
video-game study, the participant is estimating a dura-
tion of nearly an hour while engaged in a highly
absorbing leisure activity? Was mentioning at the start
of the gaming session the fact that they would be
asked for a time estimate really enough to produce a
systematic shift in the amount of ‘attention to time’
during their gameplay? Other explanations are cer-
tainly possible. For example, forewarning about the
judgment may have prompted participants to pro-
duce a preliminary estimate, perhaps based on their
estimate of how long they planned to stay (e.g., ‘I’ll
be here for about four hours’) or for the length of
time they were ‘likely to be asked about’ (e.g., ‘I
expect she’ll ask me after about an hour’). Such a
pre-estimate might serve as an ‘anchor’ when the time
came to make the actual judgment (such anchoring
effects are very common102). These caveats notwith-
standing, the increasing use of naturalistic studies pro-
vide important steps toward unified, general models of
timing; similar work has been described in other recent
studies.103–106
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Dynamic Stimuli
A second line of attack involves using traditional labo-
ratory tasks but employing dynamic, temporally struc-
tured stimuli rather than the homogenous lights and
tones of conventional research. It has long been known
that the division of an interval into sub-intervals tends
to increase its apparent duration,71 and that the rela-
tive lengths of these sub-intervals also affects temporal
judgment.107 Similarly, moving stimuli typically seem
to last longer than static ones,34 with perceived dura-
tion a positive function of speed.34,108 More recent
work has begun to extend these core observations in
several ways.
First, careful psychophysical investigations have
sought to establish the precise basis for these effects,
for example by teasing apart the contributions of
speed and temporal frequency.109,110
Second, researchers have moved beyond study-
ing the effect of speed/tempo and begun to explore the
influence of higher-order dynamics. In the first study of
this type, Matthews35 had participants judge the dura-
tion of rotating and translating shapes which either
moved with constant, gradually accelerating, or grad-
ually decelerating speed (with mean speed held con-
stant across conditions). Contrary to many theoreti-
cal accounts, perceived duration was longest for the
constant-speed stimuli and shortest for the accelerat-
ing items. The finding that decelerating stimuli seem
to last longer than accelerating ones has since been
replicated by Sasaki and colleagues111 with sine-wave
gratings; indeed, a discrete change in speed halfway
through stimulus presentation was sufficient to elicit
the effect. More recent work has investigated the
effects of changes in tempo on the perceived dura-
tion of tone sequences.33 Again, constant-rate stim-
uli had the longest perceived duration, but the effects
of temporal structure were modulated by such fac-
tors as overall physical duration, number of tones
in the sequence, rate of acceleration/deceleration,
and non-temporal aspects of the stimuli (specifically,
the pitch-relations between successive sequence ele-
ments). In particular, accelerating sequences were
judged longer than decelerating ones at 600 ms, but
this pattern reversed at 1200 ms (Figure 5, left panel).
These complex results provide strong empirical con-
straints on theoretical accounts of time perception.
Finally, researchers have begun to formally
model the effects of motion and structure on per-
ceived time. Thus, Beckman and Young112 fit different
versions of scalar timing theory18,62,113 to a temporal
bisection task that used stimuli rotating at different
speeds. In one version of the model, stimulus speed
affected the rate of the internal pacemaker; in the
other version, speed affected the magnitude of the
to-be-judged interval, on the assumption that organ-
isms discriminate amounts of change rather than
durations per se. The latter, change-based account
provided a clearly superior fit, predicting shifts
in the bisection point without the corresponding
changes in discrimination precision that characterized
the pacemaker account. In contrast, Matthews35
has argued against a change-based explanation
for the effects of second-order dynamics, and has
modeled the differences between accelerating, decel-
erating, and constant-speed stimuli by assuming
that pacemaker-rate is a function of speed and that
the output of the pacemaker is weighted differently
over the course of the interval. More recently, a
comprehensive weighted sum of segments model has
been proposed to account for the effects of sequence
structure when intervals are sub-divided into discrete
sub-intervals.33 This model assumes (1) that the
subjective duration of each segment is a negatively
accelerated (e.g., logarithmic) function of its physical
extent, (2) that the judgment of the overall interval
is obtained by summing the subjective durations of
each sub-interval, and (3) that during this summation,
more recent segments are weighted more heavily (e.g.,
because the older representations are subject to expo-
nential decay). For the specific case of tone sequences,
the model further assumes a positive relation between
pitch and perceived time. This model captures the
differences between accelerating, decelerating, and
constant-tempo sequences, and the dependency of
these effects on the physical duration of the sequence
(Figure 5, right panel). It also captures the complex
interactions among these factors and the number of
sub-intervals, the rate of acceleration/deceleration,
and the direction of pitch change (ascending vs.
descending).
The good news, then, is that researchers are
beginning to study timing and time perception using
the kinds of behavioral tasks and situations that
apply outside the laboratory, to explore the effects
of complex stimulus dynamics on perceived duration,
and to develop quantitative models of these effects. Of
course, the complexity of the natural worldmeans that
the context dependencies described earlier are likely to
be even more pronounced and unpredictable than in
the laboratory, but there is reason for optimism about
our ability to model and explain such effects.
CONCLUSION
We hope that this brief survey is sufficient to encour-
age researchers that the complexity and lability of
time perception is not all ‘bad news’. A number
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of directions stand out for future research, includ-
ing: (1) the development of progressively more uni-
fied information-processing models, which connect
time perception to other aspects of cognition such
as working memory, (2) the simultaneous appli-
cation of genetic, pharmacological, neuroimaging,
and behavioral techniques to establish comprehen-
sive accounts of the biological basis of interval tim-
ing, and (3) the extension of existing paradigms and
principles to more naturalistic situations and tasks,
particularly those with important practical conse-
quences.
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